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/WJe have people here who come at these things from very different angles. Some of
the social scientists here, for example, are people who have already done advanced work
and publication inftelds that other social scientists and lawyers don't reall know the
first thing about. There are people here who, as lawyers, are aware of the issues
presengy being litigated that the social scientists don't know the frst thing about. The
result is that almost any discussion we have of any topic is going to be miles ahead of
some people and miles behind some. **
ANTHONY AMSTERDAM
INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1977, the United States Supreme Court struck down
the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman as "cruel and unusual
punishment"' violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Coker
v. Georgia thus seemed the denouement to a campaign of litigation to
bar the capital sanction from rape prosecutions. In the mid-1960s, the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) concluded that the time was ripe to
attack through the courts one of the most pernicious forms of racial dis-
crimination-the selective employment by Southern states of capital
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte;
Ph.D. University of Virginia, 1974.
** NAACP, LEGAL DEFENSE FUND AND CENTER FOR STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY AND
LAW, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE 13 (1977).
1 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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punishment in rape cases where blacks were convicted of raping whites.2
Coker was thus the last of a series of cases, beginning with Maxwell v.
Stephens,3 in which the LDF had pressed the argument that capital rape
sentencing was racially discriminatory.
Yet, with one exception the Coker justices never even mentioned the
issue of racial discrimination in their opinions. Justice White writing for
the four-justice plurality chose to rely solely upon the contention that
the death sentence was a disproportionate punishment for a rape in
which the adult victim had not been deprived of her life.4 In reaching
this conclusion, Justice White maintained that previous cases required
him to "seek guidance in history and from the objective evidence of the
country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a
penalty" for such a crime.5 He then presented a historical sketch of the
use of the capital sanction which, he claimed, encompassed "the last 50
years. ."6 But nowhere did Justice White even hint at the presence of
racial discrimination in the imposition of the death sentence in rape
cases. For all his opinion revealed, such a possibility was not even im-
portant enough to be considered by historians.
Justice Brennan voted with the Court, but on separate grounds.
Without the slightest mention of possible racial discrimination in the use
of the death penalty in rape cases, he alluded to his dissent in the previ-
ous case of Gregg v. Georgia,7 in which he had argued that the death
penalty was per se unconstitutional as an affront to human dignity.
Justice Marshall was the only member of the Coker Court to assert
that the imposition of capital punishment was racially discriminatory.
A former General Counsel for the Legal Defense Fund, Justice Marshall
invoked his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia,8 in which he had presented
what he considered to be substantial evidence showing that racial dis-
crimination played a major role in the execution of blacks and other
minorities at rates highly disproportionate to their percentage of the
population.9
Such a general lack of treatment of the racial issue might well have
2 Michael Meltsner has recounted this campaign in M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNU-
SUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL].
3 229 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Ark. 1964), 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), app'd sub nom., Max-
well v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
4 433 U.S. at 584.
5 Id at 593.
6 Id
7 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976).
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972).




come as a shock to a large number of the criminologists and sociologists
who had studied the infliction of the death penalty in rape cases. A
string of studies transversing decades had raised grave doubts as to
whether persons were executed for rape on a "color-blind" basis.' 0 Even
such a staunch proponent of capital punishment as Ernest van den
Haag was to concede a year after Coker that the charges of racially dis-
criminatory application of capital punishment were "most often justi-
fied when the penalty was inflicted for rape." 11
Most importantly, what Bedau and Pierce described as "one of the
most definitive pieces of research ever done on capital punishment" 12
had concluded that the main variable in the execution of rapists was
whether they were blacks with white victims. Wolfgang's and Riedel's
"Rape, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty," the latest phase
of studies produced by Wolfgang-led teams since the mid-1960s, had
scrutinized 35 variables which might have explained capital sentencing
in 1,265 rape cases in 11 Southern and border states from 1945 to
1965.13 Wolfgang and Riedel had found that seven times more blacks
than whites were sentenced to death in these cases. The odds that such
an occurrence could have happened by chance were 1 in a 1,000. More-
over, Wolfgang and Riedel discovered that blacks who raped whites re-
ceived the death penalty in 36 percent of the cases, while the
comparable percentage for blacks who raped blacks or whites who raped
whites was only 2 percent. Their main conclusion, which was to go
largely unchallenged by other social scientists and statisticians, was that
the patterns discerned could only be explained as the products of racial
discrimination. ' 4
But why had the Court's opinions in Coker largely ignored such
data? Surely the relevant studies had been brought forcefully to the
justices' attention. Indeed, these studies had been continually thrust
10 See, e.g., the studies summarized in Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Racial Discrimination andthe
Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 99, 105-107 (H. Bedau & C.
Pierce eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as CAPITAL PUNISHMENT].
11 van den Haag, The Collapse of the Case Against Capital Punishment, 30 NAT'L REV. 404
(March 31, 1978). The same concession is made by two other proponents of capital punish-
ment, Lehtinen and Carrington-the latter with a specific acceptance of the validity of Wolf-
gang's "careful and comprehensive study." See F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR
UNUSUAL 210 (1978); Lehtinen, The Value of Liy: An Argument For the Death Penalty, 23 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 237, 246-47 (1977).
12 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at xvii.
13 Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Racial Diswmination, and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT, supra note 10, at 109-14.
14 Id at 118-19.
Speaking of his rape study, Wolfgang has asserted that "no statistical witness was ever
offered to contradict this evidence. Nor was any statistician, social scientist, or criminologist




before the Court in all of the major capital punishment cases from Max-
well through Coker. 15
The petitioner's brief in Coker was thus following a well-worn route
when it noted that "the overwhelming majority of defendants executed
for the crime of rape in this country in the past thirty years have been
black." Since 1930, it continued, "when reliable statistics began to be
kept by the federal government, 48 whites, 405 blacks, and 2 members of
other minorities [had] been put to death for this crime." There was his-
torical evidence that, in Georgia, as in the other Southern and border
states, "the death penalty was specifically devised as a punishment for
the rape of white women by black men . .. "6 One of the "most fre-
quent and insistent criticisms" of these states' ostensibly color-blind
post-Civil War rape statutes was that they were "administered discrimi-
natorily so that blacks were disproportionately executed for rape..."
Explicitly citing Wolfgang's and Riedel's national study, as well as their
delineation of the same patterns in an intensive analysis of Georgia, the
brief maintained that recent statistical studies had "proved the fact of
discrimination conclusively ... 17
There was thus no way for the Court to be oblivious to the Wolf-
gang analyses. If it failed to mention them, although they seemed to be
an obvious source of data and findings, there had to be other reasons. In
two introspective pieces, Wolfgang has suggested some possible explana-
tions.18 In doing so, he has lucidly presented the perspective of a sociolo-
gist-criminologist intimately engaged in the central cases.
But there are two worlds involved. It is thus essential also to look as
objectively as possible at the orientations of the one inhabited by law-
15 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1972), and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
16 Brief for Petitioner at 53, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
17 Id at 54-56. The brief traced "this history of the punishment for rape in Georgia since
the days of slavery. . . . Prior to the Civil War," it noted, "rape committed by a white man
was never regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant a penalty greater than 20 years imprison-
ment." But a rape committed by a slave or a free person of color upon a white woman was
punishable by death." One year after the abolition of slavery, however, a facially color-blind
statute was enacted, by giving juries discretion to sentence any man convicted of rape to
either death or not more than twenty years imprisonment. . . . Despite the ostensible neu-
trality of the statute," the brief concluded, alluding to Wolfgang's and Riedel's work, "the
post-Civil War racial sentencing pattern varies little from the antebellum pattern. Id
at 54.
By the time Coker was decided, there was no dearth of law review articles bringing the
Wolfgang rape studies to the judiciary's attention in ways that emphasized their relevance to
the constitutionality of the death penalty for rape. See, e.g., Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaning
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773 (1970) and White, Disproportionality
and the Death Penalty. Death as a Punishmentfor Rape, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 15 (1976).
18 See Wolfgang, The Social Scientist in Court, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 239 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Social Scientist]; Wolfgang, The Death Penalt. Social Philosophy and Social Science Research,
14 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Death Penalty].
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yers, judges, and justices. Such an exploration may well broaden our
understanding of the interplay of criminology and constitutional law in
these life-and-death cases. What follows, therefore, is a series of specula-
tions relating to why the Coker Court failed to legitimate, or even dis-
cuss, what might have been the most persuasive sociological studies ever
done relating to racial discrimination in the imposition of the death
penalty.
Social scientists find it difficult enough to explain why events do
occur; accounting for their non-occurrence is even more hazardous.
Nevertheless, such an exercise should prove heuristic. It may assist soci-
ologists and criminologists and lawyers and judges in better understand-
ing, and perhaps even overcoming, breakdowns in communication
between their respective subcultures.
The question of whether there is racial discrimination in the impo-
sition of capital punishment is of profound importance. It requires the
society's and its judicial system's most rational, accurate, and fair con-
sideration. Given this imperative, what may have been the obstacles to
discourse between the "two worlds" in the capital rape cases? Were
there powerful justifications for the Supreme Court's not legitimating
Wolfgang's findings? And if there were, did they absolve Justice White
from even mentioning the existence of the racial discrimination issue?
This inquiry might provide at least tentative answers to these and other
troubling questions concerning the court's vast discretion to use or ig-
nore social science data.
I. SPECULATIONS
A. JUDICIAL FRAILTIES
Sociologists, criminologists, and other social scientists commonly as-
sert that many judges have such deficient social science backgrounds
that they cannot even begin to fathom pertinent methodologies and
findings. It is thus not surprising that, while quoting a federal district
judge in Maxwell to the effect that statistics are "'elusive things at best,
and it is .a truism that almost anything can be proved by them,' "Wolf-
gang retorts that these "are common assertions made by persons who are
not social scientists trained in statistics." 19
Hard evidence on the extent of judicial ignorance in this area is
lacking. Even if social scientists could agree upon a standard examina-
tion of the requisites for an understanding of their studies, they could
not likely procure a scientifically selected sample of jurists willing to take
it. Nor have social scientists serving as witnesses in litigation been polled
19 Wolfgang, Social Scientist, .supra note 18, at 244.
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in an attempt to determine their impressions of the levels of comprehen-
sion of their respective judges and justices.
Nevertheless, sociologists, criminologists, and other social scientists
have disseminated a number of anecdotes purporting to demonstrate ju-
rists' failures to comprehend social science, 20 sometimes even in areas
where the latter have shown a propensity to legitimate behavioral argu-
mentation, such as in employment discrimination cases.2 ' Even if such
stories are exaggerations, there is at least strong indirect evidence that a
lack of sophistication in social science theory and methodology on the
part of the judiciary could well be an important contributor to break-
downs in communication between "the two worlds."
Judges and justices are largely products of a traditional education
not oriented toward science or mathematics, which is more suited to a
pre-computer age. Law schools generally do not have courses in the
logic of hypothesis testing and statistical analysis. The chances may
thus be poor that a jurist will possess a sophisticated grasp of the com-
plexities and nuances of testing a hypothesis, and they may be only
slightly better that his clerk has received the necessary preparation.
The ramifications of such a situation may well be far-reaching.
20 A story told by political scientist John White, a participant in the United States
Supreme Court's major reapportionment cases of the mid-1960s, is not atypical. White re-
lates that, at one point in the proceedings, participating lawyers and political scientists de-
cided to provide each Justice with an elementary primer so that he could better follow their
statistical presentations. Within a few days, according to White, they found themselves being
thanked by the Chief Justice. Addressing them from the bench, Warren expressed his appre-
ciation, but noted that neither he nor his brethren had been able to decipher the primer's
computations. Anecdote related to Professor John White's undergraduate class in State and
Local politics, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, 1963-1964 academic year.
Donald Horowitz suggests another way by which we might attempt to gauge the social
science proficiency of federal district judges, through case studies of their policy-making in
representative cases. Viewed from this perspective, he tends to be pessimistic. See D.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
21 Consider, for example, the account of a social scientist who has served as an expert
witness in such cases before one of the nation's leading federal district judges. His jurist, he
contended, did not demonstrate the "technical expertise" to follow the social science argu-
mentation. This individual concluded, however, this judge "did not have to understand all of
the arguments to get things done. He knew what he wanted to find, and it was rumored that
his clerks wrote his opinions."
Yet, it should be noted that this same observer cited Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. of the
Northern District of Alabama as a "statistical expert" in full command of such cases. And a
similarly positive impression of Judge James B. McMillan of the Western District of North
Carolina has been conveyed by sociologist Raymond Michalowski, who has testified as an
expert witness in Judge McMillan's court in well over twenty employment discrimination
cases. Michalowski has concluded that, while Judge McMillan is highly skeptical and suspi-
cious of testimony proffered by social scientists, he still evidences a firm grasp of it both in his
courtroom statements and questions and in his opinions. Interview with a political scientist
who is a frequent expert witness in Alabama federal courts at the University of North Caro-
lina at Charlotte (May 23, 1980); Telephone interview with Raymond Michalowski (June 4,
1981).
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The sociologist or criminologist may find himself faced with a serious
dilemma. If he keeps his studies simple enough to be comprehended by
what are many times individuals with possibly less understanding of so-
cial science than his own undergraduates, he may sacrifice so much
methodological potency as to make them invalid.2 2 Hence, there are
profound problems involved in social scientists' and lawyers' attempts to
"sell" what may be described as "advanced" works to the judiciary, even
when it welcomes the opportunity for such an education.
Judges, however, may well be less than enthusiastic about taking
courtroom courses from social scientists. 23 Moorer v. State of South Caro-
22 Consider, for example, the bewilderment of most members of the federal judiciary con-
fronted with this very important methodological statement from Wolfgang's and Riedel's
analysis of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty for rape in Georgia:
The general problem is to set up a function of the following form:
Z = a, x1 + a2 x 2 + a3 X 3 .... a k x k (1)
when x equals measured variables, and a equals corresponding coefficients.
The discriminant function analysis computes coefficients for equation (1). The resulting
Z values are used in an analysis of variance such that the ratio of the variance between
sentence-type groups to the variance within sentence groups is at a maximum . . . . See
Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Racial DiscrLmination and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
supra note 10, at 115.
Indeed, Judge J. Skelly Wright, long considered one of the more progressive members of
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, expressed his bewilderment and outrage at the introduc-
tion of less complex statistical analyses than these in Hobsen a. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859
(D.D.C. 1971):
[t]he unfortunate if inevitable tendency [of this argumentation] has been to lose sight of
the disadvantaged young students on whose behalf this suit was first brought in an over-
grown garden of numbers and charges and jargon like 'Standard deviation of the varia-
ble,' 'statistical significance,' and 'Pearson product moment correlations.'
See generaly Rist & Anson, Social Science and the Judicial Process in Education Cases, 6 J. L. &
EDUC. 2 (1977).
23 This reluctance may well stem, at least in part, from the relatively high average age of
judges and justices. Rosen, for example, approvingly quotes Justice Holmes to the effect that
judges "'commonly are elderly, and are more likely to hate at sight any analysis to which
they are not accustomed, and which disturbs repose of mind, than to fall in love with novel-
ties."' See Rosen, Social Science andJudicial Poliq Making, in USING SOCIAL RESEARCH IN
PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 109, 116 (C. Weiss ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as USING SOCIAL
RESEARCH].
Holmes himself seemed an excellent example of this phenomenon. Alpheus T. Mason
relates that Holmes' great friend, Justice Louis Brandeis, frequently implored him to familiar-
ize himself with what would presently be called the social sciences. To acquaint himself with
economic analysis, for example, Brandeis suggested that Holmes devote a summer to studying
the facts of the textile industry.
Holmes expressed his repugnance for Brandeis' suggestion in a letter to Sir Frederick
Pollock.
I hate facts. I always say the chief end of man is to form general propositions-adding
no general proposition is worth a damn. Of course a general proposition is simply a
string for the facts and I have little doubt that it would be good for my immortal soul to
plunge into them, good also for the performance of my duties, but I shrink from the
bore-or rather I hate to give up the chance to read this and that, that a gentleman
should have read before he dies. ...
A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 577 (1946).
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Ana ,24 one of the early cases in which the LDF sought to have the death
penalty invalidated, provides an extreme example. In Moorer, a federal
district judge in South Carolina went far beyond a refusal to consider
the Wolfgang studies relating to that state; he ordered all of Wolfgang's
South Carolina materials impounded, stipulating that they were not to
be employed at all in the attempt to save the defendant. Indeed, only
an intervention by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit liberated the data.25
The vast proportion of modern federal judges would surely react
less extremely. But the lack of a social science background of many of
them at least suggests strongly that they might well find themselves inse-
cure in the presence of such studies, and conclude that the better part of
valor would be to disregard them and rest their decisions on other bases.
At least David Riesman, an urbane traveller within both "worlds", has
so argued. Riesman has contended that law students, lawyers, judges,
and justices tend to feel that they have sufficient native intelligence, rea-
soning acumen, and common sense to resolve major legal and social
problems while "playing it by ear."'26 Hence their conscious or subcon-
scious conclusion that any social science finding not readily discernible
to them as laymen is not worth considering.27
Finally, the press of work at all levels of the federal court system
cannot be discounted. Judges and jistices are busy people. They face a
workload of cases unheard of a few decades ago. If they are to retool in
the social sciences, they must be shown that the advantages will be im-
mediate and far-reaching. Yet, a glance at some of the courts' more
24 368 F. 2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966).
25 This sorry episode is recounted by Michael Meltsner. See M. MELTSNER, Szopra note 2,
at 88.
26 "Lawyers and law professors," Riesman has written, "are very apt to be scornful of the
findings of social science":
This is an offshoot of a professional self-image of omnicompetence. . . It is also a reflec-
tion of the lawyer's wish to maintain a pattern of practice. . . in which he can play by
ear . . Science threatens this-just as the coming of automation and the enormous
demands for planning threaten the similar 'play it by ear' tendencies of old-fashioned
business executives.
D. RIESMAN, ABUNDANCE FOR WiiAT? 433 (1964).
27 But some judges do evidence a grasp of social science inquiry. See then Judge Harry
Blackmun's explanation of a null hypothesis in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 142 (8th
Cir. 1968).
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, at least, sees grounds for optimism:
Courts will learn to adapt to the changed conditions of evidence which social science
imposes on contemporary argument. . . . Indeed, lawyers with no more than a good
undergraduate grounding in social-science methodology could have quite an impact in
this area simply by establishing standards of cross-examination which are infrequently
attained today.
Moynihan, Social Science and the Courts, 54 PUB. INTEREST 12, 30 (1979).
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dramatic employments of social science might convince them that the
course is not worth taking.
B. THE THIN ICE SYNDROME
Brown v. Board of Education,28 decided in 1954, no doubt constitutes
the Supreme Court's most well known employment of psychological and
sociological studies in a case with profound implications. What did the
Court obtain for its attempt to utilize the insights of modern social sci-
ence? First, it was pilloried by a profusion of legal commentators in law
reviews, books, and other media. Second, and many years later, it was
informed by the very social science that it had trusted that some, if not
all, of the findings underwriting its opinion were primitive and invalid. 29
As Wolfgang has so correctly observed, it is of the very essence of
sociological inquiry for past studies to be continually subjected to new
modes of proof and to be cast aside when discredited. It may not be
easy, in terms of reputation and ego, for a sociologist or criminologist to
concede that his study has been invalidated. But, for a judge or justice
who has built a whole constitutional edifice on such a rejected analysis,
the result can be catastrophic.30
To build one's decision and opinion on social science, therefore,
may well make one more vulnerable than is necessary. It can involve
the giving up of future options. It can entail something that judges and
justices, as most policymakers, are loathe to do--surrender power.
Consider, for example the vicissitudes of Justice Marshall and his
use of social science to argue that there is no evidence that capital pun-
ishment is a better deterrent to murder than life imprisonment. Justice
Marshall delved deeply into the famous work of Thorsten Sellin and
other such sources to make this argument in his concurrence in Furman v.
Georgia.31 But, by Gregg v. Georgia,3 2 a mere four years later, he found
28 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29 For a summation of some of the negative response to the Court's employment of such
studies in Brown, see Rosen, Sodal Science and judicial Poliy Making, in USING SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH, supra note 23, at 113.
The latest chapter in this story centers upon James Coleman's repudiation of the 1966
report that bears his name. The Coleman Report is by far the most well-known social science
justification for the pro-busing policies of a number of federal courts and agencies. See Fiske,
Social Scientists as Plig-Shapers, The New York Times, January 8, 1980, at Cl.
30 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William Doyle has contended, for example, that
basing constitutional doctrines upon social science, with its ever-changing theories, methodol-
ogies, and findings, would be particularly hazardous. Doyle maintains that judges would
pose a great "danger to our 200-year experience in constitutional democracy" if they were to
rest their interpretations upon such sources "rather than. . . the bedrock of a coherent...
principle." See Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used in Judicial Decisionmaking?, 6 J. LAw &
EDUC. 13, 18 (1977).
31 408 U.S. 238, 348-54 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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himself confronted with a new and unforeseen challenge-Isaac Ehr-
lich's econometric arguments that the death penalty did, in fact, provide
more effective deterrence. Undaunted, Marshall counterattacked in his
Gregg dissent, lecturing Ehrlich, his brethren, the legal profession, and
the public at large on the proper use of regression analysis.33 Relying
upon a barrage of rebuttals to Ehrlich by social scientists, the Justice
now found himself in the very thick of statistical argumentation. That
hazardous venture barely completed, he was then confronted by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences-sponsored Deterrence and Incapacitati'on and its
determination that neither the analyses relied upon by Ehrlich nor him
were sufficiently valid.34 Marshall had bet quite a lot on social science.
He might well have come up losing, his constitutional arguments resting
upon a patently shaky social science foundation. 35
It is thus not surprising that a number of judges and justices forego
a heavy reliance upon sociological or criminological documentation.
Whether or not they comprehend it, they sense that employing it may
well put them out on thin ice with Marshall. It is consequently easy to
understand the considerations moving Justice John Harlan to write a
majority opinion in one of the capital punishment cases in which he
speaks disparagingly of "the infant science of criminology. ''36
32 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
33 Id at 233-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PANEL ON RESEARCH DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE
EFFECTS 8-9 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978). Blumstein has contended that
the Sellin-type and Ehrlich evidence relating to deterrence and capital punishment was "ex-
tremely well gone over" by his panel. His panel, he has noted, found that "both data sets are
flawed." "Basically," Blumstein has related, "we concluded that we remained uninformed
about any effect of capital punishment-that there are fundamental flaws in the evidence
that's presented." See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND AND CENTER FOR STUDIES IN CRIMI-
NOLOGY AND CRIMINAL LAW, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE 137 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE].
This result has led Blumstein to write recently that "unfortunately the available research
cannot yet provide useful information for policy decision ... " Blumstein, The Positive Values
of Negative Research, 3 CRIMINOLOGIST 17 (1978).
35 Moynihan credits Stewart with the proper response to this situation-to accept all the
existing research as inconclusive. See Moynihan, Social Science and the Courts, supra note 27, at
17-18.
36 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971).
Michael Finkelstein has also noted that thejudiciary's reliance upon social science find-
ings can lead to a lessening of its options, and, hence, power:
The acceptance of mathematical methods undoubtedly implies a certain yielding by
judges of their freedom of decision. . .This consequence. . . may be a source of judi-
cial reluctance to entrust decisions to them and may tempt the Court to continue the
familiar practice of casting legal rules in broad discretionary terms to ensure that legal
principles will not embarrass with results that run against the grain ofjudicial intuition.
Finkelstein, The Application of Statstical Decision Theory to theJug Discimination Cases, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 338, 375-76 (1966).
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C. BETWEEN THE STOOLS
The skepticism and suspicion many members of the federal judici-
ary already have toward the introduction of evidence from the social
sciences are too frequently exacerbated by the legal gaffes of criminolo-
gists and sociologists serving as witnesses. In the great majority of cases
the latter are blameless. It is the responsibility of their working col-
leagues in the legal profession to steer them away from such pitfalls.
Episodes like Wolfgang's testimony in the Maxwell federal habeas
corpus proceedings are not uncommon. Wolfgang has described his
frustration and chagrin on being cross-examined as to whether his study
of discrimination in Arkansas rape cases included Garland County, the
situs of the Maxwell trial. He had to reply in the negative, carefully
explaining that his scientifically selected random sample of counties did
not encompass Garland. Regardless of his attempt to convey the requi-
sites of proper social science inquiry to the federal judiciary in this case,
however, it seemed that Garland's omission counted heavily against
him. 37
Wolfgang has conveyed this episode as an example of the lack of
methodological sophistication one can find in judges. But it could just
as well be illustrative of the ways in which extant doctrines can be
brought to bear-when judges believe they are carefully abiding by
stare decisis-to mangle sociological and criminological findings.
The Legal Defense Fund took an enormous gamble in sponsoring,
implementing, and attempting to introduce into evidence Wolfgang's
famous studies. It had to assume that its chances were good for bringing
about a sweeping innovation in the ways in which a great majority of
federal judges approached such litigation. It had to convince them to
make an abrupt departure from their treatments of the vast majority of
blacks' rights cases-to find entire states, not merely their subdivisions,
guilty of racial discrimination. When the judiciary was unwilling to
take this far-reaching step, Wolfgang was left wide open for an inquiry
into Garland County's omission.
The precedents that seemed the closest to the issues in Maxwell in-
volved the systematic exclusion of minorities from grand and petit ju-
ries. In them the Supreme Court's focus had always been upon the
county in which the defendant was being tried.38 The great preponder-
ance of school and other kinds of desegregation cases that seemed less
apposite still scrutinized particular districts, cities, or counties. It thus
seemed perfectly proper to the Maxwell judges to ask Wolfgang about
37 See Wolfgang, Social Scientist, supra note 18, at 244.




Garland County. When he could not provide data for it, it was easy for
them to sweep his testimony to the periphery. Indeed, for it not to be,
the federal bench would have had to have set off on what it then re-
garded as a new and possibly hazardous course. Statewide patterns
could nullify sentences in localities for which evidence was wholly lack-
ing. The judges would have had to abandon the cautious, trial-and-
error, incremental approach that had long characterized their modus
operandi in a field as uncertain-and explosive as racial discrimination.
The federal judiciary had other troubling questions. The consent
defense was potentially the rape defendant's most powerful weapon.
How did Wolfgang account for the fact, obvious to just about any trial
judge or lawyer, that hardly any attorney would employ it in an alleg-
edly black rapist-white victim prosecution? Wolfgang's subsequent arti-
cles stated that he "controlled" for this variable, but how was never
explicitly explained. 39
It could be argued that a defense attorney's conclusion that such a
tactic would not persuade, or might even alienate, a typical jury might
reflect his own racism; or that it might reflect his accurate comprehen-
sion of the discrimination that could be expected from such juries. Such
assertions were provocative, the stuff out of which hypotheses were
made. The point was, however, that Wolfgang did not really have the
data to test them. Indeed, he would have needed a particularly sophisti-
cated study to do so. How, for example, would he have been able to
plumb the minds of defense counsel or jurors to apprehend their reac-
tions to consent defenses? Through interviews? Through statistical
39 This line of inquiry appeared in one Maxwell case after another. Federal District Court
Judge Gordon E. Young noted in Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205, 216 (E.D. Ark.
1964) that the consent defense was a substantial obstacle to conviction in many rape cases.
Yet, he concluded that Wolfgang had not adequately accounted for it and that his statistical
analysis thus represented "a rather naive attempt to ascertain why a rape conviction was
sought in one case and not in another." Id
Possibly conveying more than he intended, Federal District Court Judge J. Smith Hen-
ley asserted that the issue of consent "from a factual standpoint [was] much less likely to be
present in cases in which white women [had] been attacked by Negro men," and that the
"disproportion between death sentences imposed on Negro men convicted in interracial cases
and. .. [those] imposed in [others might] well [have been] referable in large measure to the
fact that in the former . . . the trial jurors [thus had] a firmer and more abiding conviction of
the truth of the charges. . . ." Maxell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (D. Ark. 1966) (emphasis
added).
Then Judge Blackmun noted in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 147 (8th Cir. 1968)
that it was indisputable from the Maxwell record that there was "no question, and no hint of
one, as to the victim's lack of consent."
Yet, Wolfgang's various articles were not very enlightening as to how he "controlled" for
this. See, e.g., Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Race and the Death Penalty in Georgz, 45 Am. J. ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 658 (1975); Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Racial Discnimination andthe Death Penalty in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 108-09; Wolfgang, Social Scientist, supra note 18;
Wolfgang, Death Penalty, supra note 18.
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analyses controlling for every other conceivable variable, so that one
had to conclude that the only reason the black defendant did not use
such an approach was because he rightly expected it to fail due to racial
discrimination?
The judges had raised a legitimate question. Consent was fre-
quently at the heart of successful rape case defenses. But, a consent de-
fense was hardly ever employed in black-on-white cases. How had
Wolfgang accounted for it? Such a consideration may have been para-
mount for the jurists; it seemed to be swept under the rug, ignored, or
skimmed over by the social scientists.
D. THE PASSIVE VIRTUES
There is yet another way in which the judiciary and sociologists
and criminologists live in different worlds: Doctrines are perpetually
changing, often in ways that exclude social science analyses.
A number of the Supreme Court's precepts and principles have so
combined, for example, to make virtually obsolete Wolfgang's rape evi-
dence. Yet, at a time when it might still have been current, the federal
courts sidestepped it repeatedly through explicit or implicit invocations
of what the late Alexander Bickel called the "passive virtues" doctrine.40
In brief, this precept admonishes judges and justices to avoid all
unnecessary controversies. Perhaps best delineated by Justice Brandeis
in his famous Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authoriy opinion,4 1 it advises
the judiciary not to create precedents if there are already enough to do
the job. The courts are not to look for trouble. Their capital is severely
limited. They constitute, in Alexander Hamilton's words, "the least
dangerous branch. '42 They must rely upon "the political branches" to
implement their opinions and decisions. As courts of law, rather than
broad-gauge policy-makers, they should consequently decide cases on
the most narrow grounds possible.
Thus, a court seeking not to confront the disturbing implications of
Wolfgang's study could easily invoke principles it was allegedly obli-
gated to follow in accordance with its commitment to the "passive vir-
tues." The Legal Defense Fund thus pressed its first major assault on
capital punishment per se before the Justices in Maxwell, hoping that it
would be the occasion for their legitimation of Wolfgang's findings. Ul-
timately, the result was a per curiam opinion stating that Maxwell was
being reversed under Witherspoon v. lllnois43 -a precedent that had
40 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962).
41 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
42 Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 465 (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961).
43 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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nothing to do with racial discrimination.
The onslaught was sidestepped again a year later in Mcautha v.
Californi,"4 4 where the Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, upheld
California's system of standardless jury sentencing in capital cases with-
out even mentioning the racial discrimination argument. Dissenting
opinions by Justices Douglas and Brennan barely suggested the possibil-
ity of discriminatory sentencing. In all, the Justices used 127 pages, yet
never once alluded to the Wolfgang evidence that LDF attorney
Anthony Amsterdam had maneuvered before them.
In a far more positive moment for the abolitionist movement, the
California Supreme Court, in the pathbreaking 1972 People v. Anderson ,45
declared the death penalty in violation of the state constitution. Yet,
nowhere in this highly significant case, one that a number of close ob-
servers believe contributed significantly to the momentum leading to the
United States Supreme Court's Furman v. Georgia46 holding, had the Cal-
ifornia court even so much as suggested racial discrimination might
have been involved in capital sentencing.
Did Furman finally legitimate Wolfgang's rape studies? Criminolo-
gists and sociologists who believe that it did illustrate the breakdown in
communication between the "two worlds." For nothing could be more
chimerical. Indeed, a close reading of the opinions in Furman suggests
strongly that a majority of the Court actually invalidated the use of
Wolfgang's analyses.
The Court's only official Furman opinion was a less-than-one-page
per curiam opinion stating flatly that Georgia's mode of imposing and
carrying out the death penalty violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. What followed were five separate opinions by the mem-
bers of the majority and four by the dissenters. Only three majority
justices explicitly mentioned the racial discrimination argument. And,
of these, just two, Justices Douglas and Marshall, accepted it.
Yet, even one of these, Douglas, seemed to go out of his way not to
mention the Wolfgang rape studies. He chose instead to base his show-
ing of racial discrimination upon such less developed works as those by
Koeninger 47 and Hartung,48 as well as a string of impressionistic and
44 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
45 100 Cal. Rptr. 152; 493 P.2d 880 (1972).
46 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman has been generally interpreted to hold that capital punish-
ment, as then inflicted by Georgia and a great many other states, violated the eighth and
fourteenth amendments, because it was capriciously and arbitrarily imposed on a small
number of possible defendants due to virtually standardless sentencing practices.
47 Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas; 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 132
(1969).
48 Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 ANNALS 8, 14-17 (1952).
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conclusory statements from the 1967 Presidential Crime Commission,49
Warden Lewis Lawes of Sing Sing50 and Ramsey Clark.51 Justice Doug-
las did invoke Wolfgang eventually, but when he did, it was in regard to
Wolfgang's earlier study with Kelly and Nolde of which Pennsylvania
death row inmates were able to avoid execution--one that did not come
close to the comprehensiveness and unequivocal conclusions of the
Southern rape analyses.5 2
No one relied more upon social science in his opinion than Justice
Marshall. Yet, although he cited congressional hearings and a dozen or
so other sources (including Wolfgang, Kelly, and Nolde), only once did
he allude to the rape study, doing so in a most oblique and cryptic man-
ner. The medium was a footnote to Justice Marshall's conclusion that
racial discrimination was one of the causes of the higher execution rate
among Negroes. 5 3 Included in the large number of sources invoked by it
was a series of pages in a book by Wolfgang and Cohen, Crime andRace:
Conceptions and Misconceptions Y4
Wolfgang and Cohen did employ the rape project, but only to the
very limited extent of citing a few of its initial and relatively primitive
findings relating to a single state, Arkansas. The N encompassed only 34
black and 21 white defendants. When the cases resulting in death
sentences were isolated, it dropped to 14. Using these few data, Wolf-
gang and Cohen concluded that
of the 19 defendants in rape cases involving a black defendant and a white
victim, nine-or 47 per cent-were sentenced to death. By contrast, of the
36 cases involving white offenders and white victims or black offenders and
black victims, only five--or 14 per cent-received the death sentence.55
Why was this mere fragment of the study, one whose source was
listed clearly by Wolfgang and Cohen as "Preliminary Analysis of Rape
and Capital Punishment in the State of Arkansas, 1945-1965,"56 the
only allusion made to it by Justice Marshall? And why did he refer to it
in such a circuitous way, when several highly developed Wolfgang-team
analyses were at his fingertips as a prominent part of the evidence?
Perhaps a clue is suggested by the opinion of the last member of the
49 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUST.,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967).
50 L. LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 155-60 (1928).
51 R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 335 (1970).
52 Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to
Death Row, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 301 (1962).
53 408 U.S. 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring).
54 M. WOLFGANG & B. COHEN, CRIME AND RACE: CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS
(1970).
55 I d at 81.
56 I d at 87.
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Funnan majority to mention explicitly the racial discrimination argu-
ment, Justice Potter Stewart. Justice Stewart concluded that Georgia's
death sentences were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightening [was] cruel and unusual." They fell upon a "capri-
ciously selected random handful" 57-- a conclusion that seemed directly
to fly in the face of Wolfgang's findings of clearly discernible racially
discriminatory patterns. But Stewart was not content to reject implic-
itly the Wolfgang position. Relying instead upon a Stanford Law Review
study of California's penalty jury in first-degree murder cases, he de-
clared that racial discrimination had not been proven and could best be
"put . . to one side."58
But this article had examined only one non-Southern state from
1958 to 1966. Its raw statistics relating to the proportions of death
sentences for black defendants with white victims and white defendants
with white victims were not remotely like those that the Wolfgang teams
had accumulated for the Southern and border states in the rape cases.
Wolfgang had served as one of the consultants to the Stanford Law Re-
view 59 project, and, rather than claiming that it had eclipsed his work,
the review advised specifically that its findings be compared to those of
Wolfgang's "important recent study of capital sentencing patterns in 11
Southern states from 1945 to 1965 .. "60
Stewart simply ignored these considerations. But why did he not
feel intellectually obligated to consider them? Perhaps he thought them
irrelevant. If, for some reason, Wolfgang's study were obsolete, then the
Stanford Law Review's would be the only one worth considering. But
none of the other four members of the Court's official majority had de-
clared the former to be outdated. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White
had not directed themselves to Wolfgang's study at all, with only Justice
Marshall lamely invoking it.
All four of the dissenters, however, had joined footnote 12 of Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, delivering two powerful blows against the rape
studies. First, they contended, the racial discrimination issue was not
even before the Court. In yet another invocation of the "passive vir-
tues," they argued that whether sentencing had been racially discrimi-
natory was only relevant to an attack upon capital punishment under
the Equal Protection Clause. Thus it involved issues "totally distinct
from the Eighth Amendment question to which [the Court's] grant of
57 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
58 Id at 310. The article relied upon was Note, A Study of the California PenalyJuq in First-
Degree Murder Cases: Standardless Sentencing, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297 (1969).
59 Id at 1306.
6 Id at 1421.
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certiorari was limited in these cases."'6 1
Second, even if the Court reached the merits of such an issue, the
evidence provided by the defendants had to establish far more than that
the death penalty was applied in a discriminatory fashion "in the dis-
tant past." The defendants' statistics covered periods "when Negroes
were systematically excluded from jury service and when racial segrega-
tion was the official policy of many States. Data of more recent vintage
[were] essential."'62
Hence, a conclusion on Stewart's part that the Wolfgang works
were obsolete would actually be a majority position embraced as well by
Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. And the same
would of course apply to Justice Stewart's decision to invoke the "pas-
sive virtues" to argue that the racial discrimination question should not
even be afforded the Furman Court's consideration.
That these were the steps Justice Stewart had taken was revealed
by the reasons he gave for why, in addition to the Stanford Law Review's
findings, racial discrimination had not been proven and could best be
"put. . .to one side." He simply referred the reader to footnote 12 of
the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion. In such a circuitous manner,
without even conceding that racially discriminatory sentencing was
before it, a majority of the Justices dismissed Wolfgang's study as
obsolete.63
Consequently, the way was clear for the majority of the Court in
Gregg v. Georgia" to refuse, without a single mention of the Wolfgang
works, to declare capital punishment unconstitutional per se and to ap-
prove a system for its imposition modeled on Georgia's. The Justices
produced a plurality opinion by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens;
another by Justice White and joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist;
a "statement" of Justices Burger and Rehnquist; a separate concurrence
by Justice Blackmun; and separate dissents by Justices Brennan and
Marshall. Of these, only Justice Marshall's even entertained the notion
that past patterns of racial discrimination in the imposition of capital
punishment were relevant when assessing its present constitutionality.
And Justice Marshall never once explicitly reiterated this conclusion.
The reader of his opinion was informed indirectly of the relevance of
past patterns of discrimination through a statement that Justice Mar-
shall still embraced the views expounded in his Furman concurrence re-
lating to the "basic issue presented to the Court in these cases." '65
61 408 U.S. at 390.
62 Ia
63 Id at 310.
64 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
65 428 U.S. at 231.
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It was in no way unprecedented, therefore, for Justice White to
sidestep Wolfgang's works in his Coker opinion. By means of a primitive
proportionality argument, 66 he simply delivered the coup de grace to
the Court's ever officially evaluating them. The death penalty for the
rape of an adult woman would be sruck down without an examination
of whether it had been inflicted discriminatorily. 67
Why then did none of the Justices invoke Wolfgang's most up-to-
date and powerful studies in any of these cases? Any of the reasons thus
far suggested by this article might have explanatory power. Two points
must be made for present purposes. First, one or more of the Court's
members genuinely might have been responding to a conception of the
"passive virtues," a disinclination to confront new issues when cases
could be satisfactorily decided without them. Second, as Maxwell, Mc-
Gautha, Furman, Gregg, and Coker so clearly demonstrated, if the Court or
individual Justices chose to sidestep the unsettling implications of Wolf-
gang's conclusions, they had abundant doctrinal means to do so.
E. OBSOLESCENCE
It would seem especially painful to sociologists and criminologists
that the very cases that were putting the Wolfgang rape evidence "on
hold" were also helping to make it obsolete. At least at the lower levels,
Maxwell signaled that the federal courts would continue to direct their
attention to possible discriminatory practices in the local jurisdiction in
which the defendant was being tried. They would not be responsive to
alleged findings of discriminatory patterns throughout a state as a
whole.6s The result, for probably all of Wolfgang's rural and suburban
66 One commentator aptly described the plurality's approach as "simplistic." Note, The
Death Penal for Rape-Cruel and Unusual Pushment?, 38 LA. L. REV. 868, 871 (1978).
67 433 U.S. at 584.
White's opinion was very similar to one written seven years earlier, Ralph v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970). That court concluded that the death
penalty was "so disproportionate to the crime of rape when the victim's life [was] neither
taken nor endangered that [its imposition violated] the Eighth Amendment." Id at 793. It is
significant, in light of Bickel's "passive virtues," that this holding of the Fourth Circuit-a
jurisdiction that encompassed the Wolfgang-studied states of Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia-made no mention whatsoever of the possibility
of racial discrimination in the employment of the death sentence in such cases.
68 Meltsner has insightfully recounted the impact of this decision upon Wolfgang's statis-
tical analysis in Maxwell, one that could be expected to manifest itself in similarly devastating
forms in the great majority of such cases:
There had been only three death senterices in Garland County in the last thirty years, a
number by far too small to permit statistical analysis. The Fund had argued that it was
absurd to round up the jurors who sat on Maxwell's case in 1962-assuming they could
be found-and ask them if they had sentenced Maxwell to death because he was black
... . [E]ven a team of psychoanalysts could not discover whether Garland County
juries, or Maxwell's particular jury, sentenced to death because of race.
M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 2, at 104-05.
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counties, if not also for his urban ones, was too few cases to permit a
valid analysis for a small area.
This disaster in terms of the unit of study was accompanied by an
even greater one concerning the current relevance of the data. As we
have seen, Burger's footnote 12 in Furman seemed to exclude any evi-
dence from the period when "[n]egroes were systematically excluded
from jury service and . . .racial segregation was the official policy in
many states."'69
Such a stricture, one that Justice Stewart also apparently em-
braced, would eliminate from consideration the great majority of Wolf-
gang's rape case data. That this was in fact the Court's intention
seemed even more certain after Coker. Coker showed that, for almost all
of the justices, possible patterns of racial discrimination before Furman
(1972) and Gregg (1976) were irrelevant. Furman and Gregg invalidated a
substantial number of state capital punishment statutes. The ones tak-
ing their place would apparently be viewed by the Burger Court as con-
stituting a "clean slate." Wolfgang's chronicle of death sentencing in
rape cases from 1945 to 1965 was thus obsolete.
The Court would claim that it was exploring the "history" of the
death penalty for rape in Coker. Indeed, as we have seen, the doctrine
which governed Justice White required him to do so. But his plurality
and the members of the minority-in short, a large majority--could de-
termine, for their purposes, when history actually began and with a few
strokes of the pen, Wolfgang's study became prehistory. Legislation still
unconstitutional under Furman and Gregg and other such cases could be
invalidated by them. Statutes that did not obviously run afoul of them
(and the vast proportion of them were new, having been enacted to
comply with them) would be evaluated from the date of their passage.
Thus, whatever racially discriminatory patterns Wolfgang and others
might have discerned became academic.
F. THE FOOT-IN-THE-DOOR SPECTRE
Perhaps the Justices were haunted by the ghosts of past and future
capital cases when they contemplated the Wolfgang findings. A ruling
legitimating them based on such findings would have stated, in effect,
69 408 U.S. at 390. This argument has been employed against the Wolfgang rape studies
by such proponents of capital punishment as Frank Carrington. Carrington, as noted previ-
ously, has conceded that Wolfgang's and Riedel's study was "careful and comprehensive."
He also did not "question its conclusion that during the twenty years [examined,] in Southern
states, there was discrimination in rape cases." But, he concluded, this research, covering
largely periods when blacks were systematically excluded from grand and petit juries, did not
"provide support for a conclusion that racial discrimination continues .... " E. CAR-
RINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL, .rupra note 11, at 2 10-11.
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that hundreds of blacks in rape cases went to their deaths as victims of
racially discriminatory sentencing. It would have suggested strongly
that perhaps thousands more had suffered the same fate through murder
sentences.70
Equally or more devastating, a specific endorsement of this kind of
study would have opened the floodgates to a similar attack upon the
entire criminal process, from arrest to final petition for a habeas corpus
writ or attempt to secure executive clemency. Once the Court legiti-
mated such weapons, they would be turned loose upon the whole sys-
tem. The result would likely be a "legal revolution" making the Warren
years look like a retrenchment. The entire prosecutorial process would
be vulnerable to social science assault through the employment of analo-
gous, or even more refined, methodologies. 71 These implications might
have seemed too radical, even for the Court's most liberal members.
Wolfgang's methodology might have been viewed as a Pandora's Box
containing the most revolutionary hypotheses or lines of speculation.
G. PAYING THE PIPER: AN IMAGE PROBLEM?
Could the federal courts have been especially skeptical of Wolf-
gang's findings because the LDF had financed his study? Could they
have been influenced by the fact that Wolfgang was an abolitionist
before the rape project? Might they have considered that, by the time
Coker was heard, most of the research claiming to have discovered ra-
cially discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing was by social scien-
tists who were also committed abolitionists? 72
70 Students of racial discrimination and the death penalty have long suggested this hy-
pothesis. See, e.g., M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 2, at 97, 106. In an
obvious understatement, Wolfgang noted that in Maxwell, "[W]e had trouble with the
Supreme Court recognizing that the trial process in Arkansas should be condemned over a
twenty-year period." NAACP DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 69.
71 The possibility that a legitimation by the federal courts of Wolfgang's rape studies
would subject the entire prosecutorial process to a similar challenge has long been recognized
by Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Racial Discriminatlion and the Death Penaly, in CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, supra note 10, at 119 and NAACP, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at
56.
It has also been relied upon by their opponents. See, e.g., the comment by Bryant Huff, a
Gwinnett County, Georgia prosecutor that such a decision would "make it impossible to send
anybody to jail"-a view that, he contended, the United States Supreme Court shared with
him. Grieder, The Return of the Death Penaly, The Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1976, at B-5.
72 Abolitionist reportage of such research has not always helped its image. In an article
entitled "SPLC Sponsored Execution Study," for example, the Southern Poverty Law Center
announced grandiosely that William Bowers' examination of whether there was a correlation
between the race of murder defendants and their victims and the application of the death
penalty would "prove or disprove" the theory "that prosecutors and juries tend to reserve the




It is likely that a large number of federal judges and justices agree
with Daniel Patrick Moynihan's contention that "social science is rarely
dispassionate, and social scientists are frequently caught up in the poli-
tics which their work necessarily involves."' 73 Moreover, such jurists
might also concur in Christopher Jencks' statement that, in such disci-
plines, "He who pays the piper writes the questions. .... -74
This basic skepticism, one no doubt greatly strengthened by the
spectacle of defense and prosecution teams of "house" psychiatrists in
perpetual pitched battles in cases involving insanity defenses, 75 might
well be exacerbated by the occasional charges by judges such as J. Skelly
Wright that the social scientists testifying before them have "fudged"
their analyses: "[T]he studies by both sets of experts are tainted by a
vice well known in the statistical trade--data shopping and scanning to
reach a preconceived result, and the court had to reject parts of both
reports as unreliable because they were biased." 76
Wolfgang has maintained that he certainly would have dissemi-
nated his findings just as completely if no discrimination had been dis-
covered.77 Everything in his highly distinguished career gives credence
to this contention. Nor has anyone ever challenged his or his colleagues'
intellectual integrity in the conduct of these analyses. Nevertheless, re-
searchers in this area are painfully aware that their work may literally
have life-and-death implications. It is conducted by social scientists
who, in general, are already strong proponents or opponents of the
death penalty. Many times it is funded by interest groups intimately
interested in the outcome. It tends to be done in the heat of battle and
frequently in a rush, so that its fruits will be available for the next fate-
ful court testing.
In such a context, it would not be surprising if a large number, if
not most, members of the federal judiciary tended to view the findings of
social science as comparable to those of opposing psychiatrists in in-
sanity defense cases. Such concerns might well have hindered the
courts' consideration, much less legitimation, of Wolfgang's rape studies.
73 Moynihan, Social Science azd the Courts, supra note 27, at 19.
74 Quoted in Fiske, Social Scientists as Polij-Shapers, supra note 29, at C4.
75 This phenomenon has not escaped the condemnation of presidential counselor Edwin
Meese:
A good portion (of criminal trials) is taken up with hot-and-cold running psychiatrists for
both sides telling all the things wrong with the accused. . .The way psychiatrists are
now pushed and tugged and, in effect, compromised with their medical standards in
order to provide testimony for one side or the other-this is a disgrace to their profession.
Meese, End Pleas ofInsanity, The Charlotte Observer, Apr. 16, 1981, at 13A.
76 Hobson v. Hanson, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.DC 1971).




Why might the Court have relied heavily upon sociological and
psychological analyses in Brown v. Board of Education ,78 while not men-
tioning them in the great majority of subsequent desegregation cases?
Why did it seem in step with modern criminology's conception of when
the prosecutorial process began in Miranda v. Arizona 79 to abandon that
perspective for a far more rigidly legalistic one in Kirby v. Illinois80 and
Gerstein v. Pugh ?8i And why did this same pattern seemingly manifest
itself in In re Gault and its successors?8 2
One possible answer is reminiscent of Charles Miller's comments
about when the justices seem to rely upon historical and sociological, in
contrast to purely doctrinal, arguments. Miller contends that findings
from these disciplines are far more in demand when a majority of jus-
tices is about to trailblaze in a new direction and the number of persua-
sive precedents is accordingly low. A break with past cases somehow has
to be justified.83 What Justice Benjamin Cardozo referred to as the
method of logic, philosophy, or analogy will not carry the freight. The
Court thus turns to Cardozo's methods of history or evolution, custom or
tradition, or, perhaps most commonly in recent years, sociology or social
engineering.84
Hence, to the extent that the Burger Court wants to "cool down"
the law in the wake of its reformist predecessor, it will generally be un-
receptive to social science analyses attempting to test hypotheses relating
78 347 U.S. 483 (1954); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 19
(1969).
79 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
81 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See M. Spicker & H.E. Pepinsky, The Role of Criminology in
Formulating Constitutional Doctrine (Nov. 8, 1979) (paper presented at 1979 Annual Meet-
ing of American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, Pa.).
82 See V. Streib, Application of Delinquency Theory by the Supreme Court, (Nov. 8,
1979) (paper presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology,
Philadelphia, Pa.). The citation for In re Gault is 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Contra, Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).
83 C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY, supra note 78, at 200.
84 See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51-141 (1921).
Riesman has argued along these lines that, at its lowest level, "social science provides
new gimmicks to be used in advocacy. . . . I believe this to be the function of the 'Brandeis
brief,' he argues, "an allegedly impartial but actually polemical use of documentation...
to overwhelm or provide new generalizations for judges .... ' D. RIESMAN, ABUNDANCE
FOR WHAT? supra note 26, at 446.
Wolfgang has also noted insightfully that "the social scientist who becomes involved in
testifying in this area must be prepared for arguments and decisions that are political or that
reside in legal vicissitudes outside the framework of social science inquiry and evidence."
Wolfgang, Social Scientist, supra note 18, at 244.
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to racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty.85 Some
sociological studies do tend to support the status quo, but a substantial
85 But consider the response to such studies of an appellate court with seemingly very
different intentions. The Massachusetts Supreme Court's recent holding in District Attorney
for the Suffolk District v. James Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1962), struck down the state's
capital punishment statute as violative of the Massachusetts Constitution Art. 26, the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. Chief Justice Hennessey's majority opinion held, inter alia,
that such an infliction of the death penalty would be racially discriminatory.
As evidence, ChiefJustice Hennessey employed a quote about America's use of the capi-
tal sanction in general from the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad-
ministration of Justice. He simply alluded to C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).
His main empirical support, however, came from statistics disseminated by Bowers and
Pierce in 1979. See W. Bowers & G. Pierce, Preliminary Tabulations Reflecting Arbitrariness
and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes (Aug. 1, 1979) (Center for Applied
Social Research, Northeastern University). ChiefJustice Hennessey thus noted that, from the
time of the passage of the Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio post-Furman capital statutes,
through 1977, the following patterns had emerged:
In Florida, of 286 blacks who had killed whites, forty-eight (16.8%) were sentenced to
death; of 111 whites who killed blacks, none were sentenced to death. In Georgia, of 258
blacks who killed whites, thirty-seven (14.3%) were sentenced to death; of seventy-one
whites who killed blacks, two (2.8%) were sentenced to death. In Texas, of 344 blacks
who killed whites, twenty-seven (7.8%) were sentenced to death; of 143 whites who killed
blacks, none were sentenced to death . . . [In Ohio,] of 173 persons who killed white
persons, thirty-seven of them (21.4%) were sentenced to death. Of forty-seven whites
who killed blacks, none were sentenced to death.
Id at 1285. He then concluded that these figures, in and of themselves, demonstrated that
racial discrimination in capital sentencing had continued into the post-Funnan years. Id. at
1286.
But how did statistics for Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio show that the infliction of
the death penalty in Massachusetts would be racially discriminatory? For one thing, Chief
Justice Hennessey contended that the Ohio figures indicated that such discrimination was not
confined to the South. For another, he could cite two cases-Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) and Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385
N.E.2d 227 (Mass. 1978)-which, he maintained, led his court to take notice of the fact that
racial prejudice existed "in some persons" in his state. There was thus no reason to assume,
he concluded, that the patterns observed in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio would not
appear in Massachusetts. Id at 1286.
Was Chief Justice Hennessey's analysis comparable to that employed by federal courts
confronted with such studies? The respective burdens of proof would seem radically different.
The federal judiciary had never legitimated a showing of racial discrimination premised on
nothing more than a comparison and contrast of the races of death-sentenced offenders and
their victims.
The LDF had commissioned Wolfgang's study because it needed a good deal more than
sentencing disparities in capital rape cases. It had to be able to demonstrate that the impacts
upon such patterns of all other plausible variables were relatively insignificant. [For a recent
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding indicating that the federal courts have in no way
lowered this standard under the eighth amendment or the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses of the fourteenth amendment, see Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 612-16
(5th Cir. 1978).] Hence, it was only after Wolfgang found them to be negligible that he
concluded that the infliction of the death sentence in rape cases was racially discriminatory.
But Chief Justice Hennessey ignored the question of whether other factors might have
had a significant impact, even though he was examining an area, murder, where the potential
for their influence may well have been far greater. (For a vivid exposition of the argument
that there are far more obstacles to controlling for non-racial variables in homicide sentencing
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majority would seem to do the opppsite. Whether this characteristic
stems from the ideologies of the persons who decide to pursue careers in
the social sciences, or the research topics or methodologies they choose,
many of their findings tend to be socially and politically unsettling.
Such a thrust cannot be expected to be welcomed warmly by jus-
tices in the Burger mold. Indeed, the Chief Justice himself, invoking the
Court's allegedly highly limited capabilities to evaluate such research,
has more or less told investigators of the Wolfgang stripe to take their
works elsewhere. The executive and legislative branches, he has con-
cluded, are far better equipped to give such analyses a proper hearing.
8 6
It is thus possible that the Court is attuned to the ramifications of
studies like Wolfgang's. Indeed, their possible consequences may have
constituted the main reason it failed to cite, much less legitimate, them.
II. IMPLICATIONS
This article has attempted to sketch the different modes of thought
of criminologists and sociologists, on the one hand, and the federal judi-
ciary, on the other, relating to the issue of possible racial discrimination
in capital rape sentencing. In doing so, it has shown how a social science
work of major importance can be lost in the hazardous seas between
them. What might be some of the lessons of this episode? They can at
least be suggested through a consideration of two factors. First, we
might consider whether Wolfgang-like studies have outlived their useful-
ness as evidence in death penalty litigation. Second, we might deter-
mine whether our analysis suggests ways in which social scientists and
judges and justices might improve communication between their respec-
tive "worlds."
than in that relating to rape, see NAACP, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE, at 71 (remarks of
Stephen Schulhofer). See also note 88 in/ra.
There were still other major ways in which the Watson Court legitimated statistical argu-
ments falling far below federal judicial criteria. Its data were not even for Massachusetts. In
contrast, federal jurists in Maxwell tended to be hostile to statistics from jurisdictions outside
of Garland County.
Of course, Chief Justice Hennessey attempted to link these data to Watson through the
Soares and Frank/in cases. But neither of these involved racially discriminatory sentencing,
and it is highly doubtful that the Burger Court, for example, would have ever endorsed such a
linkage. Soaris held that a trial judge's permitting a prosecutor to employ his preemptory
challenges so as to exclude 12 of the 13 eligible black jurors from the panel in a black defend-
ant's murder trial was reversible error-even though there was no showing of an explicit
intent on the prosecutor's part to racially discriminate. [Mass. Adv. Sh. 593 (1979).] The
pages cited for Franklin merely contained black defendants' uncontradicted evidence that
they had been the victims of vicious and violent criminal harrassment and racially discrimi-
natory law enforcement as a result of disturbances in an East Boston housing project where
members of their race constituted a small minority.
86 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 404-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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A. THE WOLFGANG-LIKE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION STUDY: A
VANISHING SPECIES?
The most cursory glance at modern sociology and criminology
shows that studies analogous to Wolfgang's are being produced in great
profusion.8 7 Nor are lawyers seeking to overturn the death penalty ig-
noring them,8 8 despite the fact that they may have achieved their most
persuasive form in the rape cases. Perhaps it could be argued that the
87 The Bowers and Pierce work employed in District Attomfor the Su olk District a. Watson,
supra note 85, is an important example of these numerous endeavors. See Death Rows: Color
Them Mosty Black, The Charlotte Observer, March 6, 1978, at Al.
88 See NAACP, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 72-73 (remarks of Morris
Dees). Many of these studies are being introduced into evidence despite such serious pitfalls
as the following.
First, federal courts still indicate a strong tendency to discount statewide statistics. In
Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), for example, the Court conceded
that Furman required it to consider Spenkelink's allegation that Florida, as a whole, discrimi-
nated against murderers with white victims in its capital sentencing. But, it maintained that
it need do nothing more than determine whether the state followed "a properly drawn statute
[under Furman] in imposing the death penalty. . . ." 578 F.2d at 613. If Florida met this
criterion, the cruel and unusual punishment issue of racial discrimination evaporated.
Nor would the court devote considerable time and energy to such data, absent a showing
of an explicit intent or purpose on the part of the state to racially discriminate. Invoking
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), the Fifth Circuit sounded very
much like the federal courts in the early stages of Maxwell: "If a petitioner can show some
specific act or acts evidencing intentional or purposeful racial discrimination against him,
: * . either because of his own race or [that] of his victim, the federal district court should
intervene and review substantively the sentencing decision." 578 F.2d at 614.
Second, how are such studies to include the controls for all other plausible non-racial
variables that the federal judiciary seems to be demanding? See 578 F.2d at 612-16. This
quandary has been sketched vividly by Stephen Schulhofer:
Marvin [Wolfgang] and Tony [Amsterdam] studied Arkansas over a twenty-year period,
and they were looking only at rape cases. When the
, 
got down to the bottom line in cases
in which the defense of consent was not raised, or the victim and offender did not know
each other, and so on, there were simply too few cases in the cell. Their study was
convincing to me, but the Court felt that there were too few cases in the cell to convinc-
ingly make the point that racial discrimination was involved necessarily. That was after
twenty years. I don't think we can wait for twenty years to bring the case again; and we
have now-instead of rape cases where the general context is relatively coherent-we
have homicide situations involving burglary, robbery, rape, or straight-out killing unas-
sociated with any other crime. The potential number of variables is very much greater.
The danger I see is that in this sort of after-the-fact statistical analysis, "N" is going to
have to be very large before you're at the point where you have enough cases in all the
cells to be able to say which variables are significant.
NAACP, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 71.
Additionally, the federal courts may be conducting themselves as good social scientists in
demanding that all plausible non-racial variables be shown to be insignificant. As we have
seen, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has determined that racial discrimination was behind
the marked disparities between the number of blacks who killed whites and the reverse on
Florida's Death Row. See note 85 supra.
Yet, the Fifth Circuit, faced with comparable data in Spenkelink, noted that there was at
least one plausible non-racial variable for which Spenkelink had not controlled. The state
had contended that Florida murders involving black victims tended not to be the kinds for
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time, energy, and intelligence devoted to them could better be employed
in other dimensions of the abolitionist campaign. It is obvious that,
from the perspective of social science, these analyses have contributed
substantially to our understanding of the role of racial discrimination in
capital sentencing. But can they be expected to "strike pay dirt" in
court?
Based on the considerations explored above, it would seem that the
chances of the LDF's, ACLU's, or the Southern Poverty Law Center's
winning major federal cases on a successful formal showing of racial dis-
crimination in the infliction of the death penalty for murder are ex-
tremely low, regardless of the inherent validity of their studies. Indeed,
it would not be surprising, given the past record and the inclinations of
the Burger Court, if many members of the federal judiciary employed
all sorts of techniques whereby they would not only fail to legitimate
such analyses, but sidestep them entirely.89
Yet, despite the odds, it is most unlikely that the abolitionists will
abandon them. There is always the possibility, no matter how small, of
the sudden and dramatic breakthrough. 90 Attempts will also be made
to keep them in the forefront of the public's consciousness. The pro-
foundly disturbing questions they raise about the justice and constitu-
tionality of contemporary death sentencing will not be allowed to
evaporate. 91
And there is yet another reason why attorneys will continue to press
which the death sentence was appropriate, involving primarily "'family . .. , lovers' .
liquor. . ., and barroom quarrels.'" 578 F.2d at 612.
Could the Fifth Circuit have acted appropriately in demanding that Spenkelink account
for it? A recent study by Lewis, Mannle, Allen, and Vetter suggests strongly, at the very least,
that such an inquiry could be insightful and suggestive. Conducting the first post-Furman
profile of the inmates on Florida's Death Row, this team made what it considered to be an
"especially surprising finding"--"about two-thirds of the victims were total strangers to the
offender."
Although earlier studies have indicated that in three-fourths of all homicides, the victim
and his slayer know each other (e.g., relative, friend, lover), . . . [these inmates] ...
most often killed a person whom they had not previously met.
Moreover, Lewis, et al. also found that most often "these killings occurred during the
course of some other felony (e.g., burglary, robbery, rape) .... " In short, such murderers
might well have been the very ones most properly being selected for the capital sanction
under the aggravating and mitigating circumstances criteria of Florida's post-Furman statute.
Lewis, Mannle, Allen, & Vetter, Post-Furman Profile ofFlorida s Condemned-A Question of Dicrim-
ination in Terms of the Race of the Vitim and a Comment on Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 9 STETSON L.
REV. 1, 22 (1979).
89 On the positive side for the abolitionists, however, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
may lead to a loss of specificity in sentencing statutes which could make charges of racial
discrimination more facially plausible.
90 See the discussion of Watson, note 85 supra.
91 Michael Meltsner, for example, has invoked a powerful moral and ethical justification
for them: "[N]hen human life is at stake constitutional doubts never die." See L. STEVENS,
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such studies-their hunch that maybe, behind-the-scenes, works like
Wolfgang's do influence the judges' and Justices' decisions although
they are not formally endorsed in the opinions. 92 Could it be that, ei-
ther consciously or subconsciously, judges and justices do find them per-
suasive? Such a hypothesis would be extremely difficult to test.
Nevertheless, previously confidential data from the late Justice Tom C.
Clark's private papers93 suggest that such an influence could well be at
DEATH PENALTY: THE CASE OF LIFE VERSUS DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LIFE VERSUS DEATH].
From a more pragmatic perspective, a major part of the abolitionist movement's public-
ity campaign involves its keeping the racial discrimination issue a highly salient one for all
relevant governmental institutions. This strategy entails a conscious attempt to influence the
societal context in which judges and justices approach capital cases.
Anthony Amsterdam has argued, for example, that the issues of racial, economic, and
sexual discrimination "are important not only because of their potential legal force, but be-
cause they permit us to raise doubts in the minds of judges, [legislators,] and the general
public, about the fairness of the administration of the death penalty and its conformity to the
supposed penological goals of capital punishment." NAACP, DEATH PENALTY CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 34, at 47.
This strategy is obviously facilitated by the media's ready and widespread dissemination
of such allegations. See, as two of many examples, Braden, It Just Works Out That Way, The
Washington Post, June 4, 1979, at A-27 and Wicker, Death Trap--Florida's Executions Mock
Justice, The Charlotte Observer, June 25, 1979, at 8A, arguing in the wake of the Spenkelink
execution that capital sentencing is racially and economically discriminatory. The Associated
Press, among other media, also gave extensive coverage to Hugo Bedau's recent testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposition to Chairman Strom Thurmond's bill to
"reinstitute the death penalty for certain crimes . . . ." The story paraphrased Bedau as
maintaining that, despite Furman, "almost all of the 700 people now on death row are blacks,
many of them convicted of killing white people." Hearings Open On Death Penalty Proposals,
The Charlotte Observer, April 28, 1981, at 2A.
Arguments based on racial discrimination, even ultimately unsuccessful ones, also play a
substantial role in abolitionist attempts to "buy time" to keep individual Death Row inmates
alive and create a "logjam" in the implementation of many, if not all, executions. See
NAACP, DEATH PENALTY CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 37. This issue, for example, may
well have saved the lives of Maxwell and inmates similarily situated long enough for their
cases to be won under Witherspoon.
92 Kenneth Murchison has intimated that the Coker decision might well have been af-
fected by the justices' unexpressed recognition of an obvious history of racial discrimination in
the imposition of capital punishment in rape cases. Indeed, Murchison finds it "reasonable to
hypothesize that the Court was influenced by the likelihood of discrimination against black
defendants" in a large number of its landmark criminal justice cases. Murchison, Toward a
Perspective On the Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORY L. J. 544-45 (1978).
In a similar vein, one commentator wondered "to what extent unspoken factors also
influenced the [Coker] plurality's decision. . . . Several groups were pressuring the Court to
forbid the death penalty for rape," she observed. "The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, [for
example,] had worked for years to end the use of the penalty in rape cases because it alleged
that historically the penalty was used selectively against black men who raped white women."
Note, The Death Penalty For Rape, supra note 66, at 870.
See also Anthony Amsterdam's comments, note 91 supra; NAACP, DEATH PENALTY
CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 72-73 (remarks of Morris Dees).
93 Memorandum to the Conference from Mr. Justice Goldberg r.e. Capital Punishment
(r.e., Rudolph v. Alabama, Oct. Term 1963, Misc. 308) (unpublished papers of Justice Tom C.
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work in the justices' decision of cases.
Michael Meltsner has argued that no case was more important in
launching the Legal Defense Fund's campaign against capital punish-
ment than Rudolph v. Alabama . 4 In Rudolph, the Supreme Court, by
means of a per curiam opinion, simply denied certiorari. Its action
threatened Rudolph's very existence. To almost the entire legal profes-
sion, however, the case would have scarcely been worth noticing had
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, not
dissented.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Goldberg raised for the first time
the question of whether capital punishment for rape was per se violative
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The LDF, which was cogni-
zant of the disproportionate number of black men who had been exe-
cuted in Southern and border states, had been called to the struggle by
Justices Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan. Goldberg's opinion did not
mention racial discrimination as a possible factor in such cases, a dra-
matic omission that the LDF interpreted as a signal that this issue was
still too controversial to be considered. Nevertheless, the LDF, inspired
by an invitation of at least a third of the Court to begin the assault
against the death sentence in rape cases, was soon sponsoring the re-
search that was to culminate in Wolfgang's famous studies.95
Had the possibility of racially discriminatory sentencing actually
been a significant factor for Justice Goldberg when drafting the initial
version of the Rudolph dissenting opinion? An early stage of Justice
Goldberg's dissent in the Clark files contains a footnote that disappeared
from the final published version. Justice Goldberg argued that a per-
suasive argument could be made "against the constitutionality of death
as a punishment for sexual crimes not endangering human life." Then
followed the ill-fated footnote:
This would also eliminate the well-recognized disparity in the imposition
of the death penalty for sexual crimes committed by whites and nonwhites.
See, e.g., National Prison Statistics, April 1952, which indicates that be-
tween 1937 and 1951, 233 Negroes and 26 whites were executed for rape in
the United States.96
Why this disappeared from the final opinion is an interesting ques-
Clark, University of Texas Law School Library, Austin, TX) [hereinafter cited as Memoran-
dum to the Conference].
94 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
95 M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 2, at 29-30. Stevens had character-
ized the impact of the Goldberg dissent in the following manner: "Justice Goldberg's words
appeared like a flash in the dark, illuminating views held by an important segment of the
Court, views many opponents of capital punishment were surprised to discover," L. STEVENS,
LIFE VERSUS DEATH, supra note 91, at 92.
96 Memorandum to the Conference, sura note 93, at 18.
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tion. Perhaps Justice Brennan had something to do with it, or maybe
Justice Goldberg reconsidered it. The reason or reasons explaining its
omission, though, are largely immaterial. What is important is that it
was initially a part of the opinion-at least a partial influence upon
Justice Goldberg that he did not acknowledge in his published version.97
B. PRESCRIPTIONS
Wolfgang has delineated lessons which his rape study experience
might provide for social scientists participating in similar litigation.98
Most of his excellent insights need not be reiterated here. This article,
however, has examined in more detail the considerations that might
have motivated the federal judiciary in these cases. In doing so, it may
have conveyed to criminal justicians a greater appreciation of the judi-
cial subculture.
It is easy for sociologists and criminologists to blame most of the
breakdowns in communication between them and federal jurists on the
latter's alleged ignorance of the basics of social science inquiry. But, as
noted previously, there is no extant precise measurement of the degree
to which judges and justices cannot fathom behavioral methodologies
and findings. While the federal judiciary's lack of scientific proficiency
may have played a role, there were also powerful justifications for the
courts' refusal to legitimate the Wolfgang rape studies. Social scientists
involved in such activities should strive to convey their approaches and
conclusions in language that can be understood by individuals with
much more limited theoretical and methodological backgrounds. 99
They would be wise, however, to take account of far more. The
"thin ice syndrome"' 00 not only is, but should be, a profound concern of
jurists who find themselves in a policy-making role. Scientifically bril-
liant studies that nevertheless fall "between the stools"''1 may not be
97 Justice Goldberg has since maintained that three factors influenced his 1963 Rudolph
memorandum: "[t]he finality of death, its failure as a deterrent, and the arbitrary fashion in.
which the death penalty was being imposed." In a footnote to this explanation, he observed
that there "was disturbing evidence that the imposition of the death penalty had been arbi-
trary, haphazard, capricious and discriminatory. For example, the impact of the death pen-
alty had been demonstrably greatest among disadvantaged minorities." See Goldberg, The
Death Penaly for Rape, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1,5 (1978).
98 Seegenera~y, the two Wolfgang accounts alluded to in this article, Wolfgang, SocialSien-
ist, supra note 18; Wolfgang, Death Penalty, supra note 18.
99 Consider, for example, the admonition of Judge J. Skelly Wright, in Hobsen . Hansen,
327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971). Having hired their respective experts, he concluded,
"the lawyers in this case had a basic responsibility. . . to put the hard core statistical demon-
strations into language which serious and concerned laymen could, with effort, understand."
See Rist & Anson, supra note 22, at 2.
100 See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
101 See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
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welcomed by judges and justices believing it their duty to operate within
the parameters of governing doctrines. Members of the judiciary who
may be condemned by social scientists as "ducking the issues" or "cop-
ping out" may be responding to what they consider one of the most
noble of all imperatives, "the passive virtues. ' 10 2 Social scientists on the
cutting edges of their discipline must be resilient enough to respond to
doctrinal changes that would make their findings legally obsolete. 10 3
They should be aware that the "foot-in-the-door spectre" and the "pay-
ing the piper problem" may be working against them, 10 4 but that the
hunch that jurists may be responding positively to their studies behind-
the-scenes may have some foundation. 105
Wolfgang has suggested that such social scientists work closely with
skilled legal practitioners from the inception, to the presentation in
court, of their studies. This advice is splendid, but perhaps they should
go even further. Their chances for the successful employment of their
scholarship in similar cases might be enhanced by a greater appreciation
of the judges' and justices' subculture. This understanding might be ob-
tained through observation, experience, reading, or formal courses. Re-
gardless of how it is acquired, however, sociologists and criminologists
would seem to have much to gain by devoting far more attention and
energy to understanding their judicial audience.
Additional education might also go far within the other world. The
fact remains that the federal judiciary does tend to lack a preparation in
the social sciences. The federal courts are already being assailed regu-
larly for their alleged deficiencies in comprehending the implications of
their policy-making. 0 6 It seems inconceivable that they can overcome
this criticism and continue to function as viable institutions without ap-
preciable social science expertise. Judges and justices, at a minimum,
should have an acquaintance with statistical inference. At least an ex-
posure to the implications of the scientific method would seem a requi-
site, given the nature of the courts' present and future dockets. Maybe
law clerks and younger jurists will bring more of these proficiencies into
the profession in the coming years. Nevertheless, the need is obvious
right now for members of the federal judiciary to become familiar with
social science methodology through courses, perhaps sponsored by
groups such as the Federal Judicial Conference, that would at least in-
troduce them to the basics of modern social science.
Perhaps the two worlds could work together more effectively to illu-
102 Se text accompanying notes 40-67 supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
104 See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
105 See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
106 See D. HORowrrz, supra note 20, at 255-98.
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minate serious policy problems if the Supreme Court sets a better exam-
ple in its treatment of social scientists' data and findings. Eugene
Rostow has noted eloquently that the Court is a continuing seminar into
the ideals and realities of our constitutional system. The justices cannot
escape being important teachers. I07 Thus, when they trivialize or treat
frivolously the contributions of social science, they invite the lower fed-
eral judiciary-indeed the entire society-to do the same.
It may not be correct to fault Justice White for his refusal to legiti-
mate the Wolfgang rape studies in Coker v. Georgia. Indeed, a major part
of this article has demonstrated that the Court could well have dis-
cerned forceful reasons why such an endorsement would be highly inap-
propriate. It might also be defensible that the Coker plurality considered
studies of possible racial discrimination before Furman obsolete. It could,
as a policy-maker, attempt to start with a clean state, examining
whether present capital punishment statutes are discriminatory.
What is censurable in the White opinion is the way in which it
sidestepped the issue dramatized by Wolfgang's inquiries. White actu-
ally contended that he was examining the history of the use of capital
rape statutes during the last fifty years. In doing so, he put himself
within the time frame of Wolfgang's analyses. Whether or not Wolf-
gang's work was valid, Justice White was confronted with a situation in
which such legislation had been employed almost exclusively by South-
ern states to bring about the execution of close to ten times as many
blacks as whites. It would thus seem that any reasonable "history" of
the use of this sanction would have had to have at least acknowledged
that a prominent issue was whether it had been inflicted in a racially
discriminatory fashion. But Justice White failed to even identify it as a
source of contention.I08
107 Rostow has observed that the Supreme Court is, "among other things, an educational
body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar." E. RosTow, THE
SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAw 167-68 (1962).
108 As Charles Miller has so eloquently argued,
[t]he political authority of the Court often endows it with a certain intellectual authority.
By writing history into its opinions the Court contributes to the public's view of the
American past as much as, and sometimes even more than, professional historians and
other historical writers do. When the Supreme Court has a chance to tell us what Ameri-
can history is, history becomes more than a tool of decision. It affirms or denies the
significance of past events for the activities of the present. . . With the increased scope
and power granted the Court by the use of history goes the increased responsibility in the
handling of historical materials.
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY, supra note 78, at 25.
But, what Wolfgang noted so aptly about the trial process applied directly and obviously
to Justice White's opinion in Coker: "[I]n Court . . . there is selectivity unlike that which
exists in science. If history were written with such selectivity, if psychology, sociology and
other kinds of research were performed in an adversary style, science would rush too quickly
to conclusions or be aborted in its efforts." Wolfgang, Social Scientist, supra note 18, at 246.
Indeed, perhaps the eight justices in Coker who utterly ignored the existence of the racial
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Such a performance could hardly impress social scientists with the
Court's sincerity in seeking information from them on an issue of such
life-and-death implications.10 9 Justice White's opinion thus seemed far
more of a white-wash than a quest for illumination. The societal stakes
in this and so many other policy areas would suggest strongly the need
for the judicial world to produce something far more intellectually
defensible.
This discussion has suggested ways in which the breakdown in com-
munication between the "two worlds" might be ameliorated. In doing
so, we are aware that such prescriptions will not bring about the millen-
nium. Yet, they surely transcend a mere conclusion that the fate of
Wolfgang's rape studies demonstrates the human predicament, or, to
paraphrase Friedrich Nietzsche, that humankind is all too human.
There may be grounds for optimism. Donald Horowitz tells us that fed-
eral judges have a strong tendency to be generalists.' t 0 Acquiring a gen-
eral orientation toward social science might well be something that they
would find to be not only useful, but appealing. Social scientists seem
pulled powerfully in the opposite direction. An attempt to acquire a
broad appreciation of judicial policy-making might provide at least a
partial curative to too narrow a specialization. In the long term, it may
well prove more helpful to them than answers to a question that they
frequently pose to colleagues in the legal profession: "What data do
those judges want from us now?".
discrimination issue might well consider Alfred Kelly's observation that the "truth of history
does not flow from its usefulness."
In this respect, does Coker suggest that the Burger Court deserves the following Kelly
indictment as much as, or even more than, its predecessor?"
[Tihe present use of history by the Court is a Marxist-type perversion of the relation
between truth and utility. It assumes that history can be written to serve [certain impor-
tant] interests. The whole process calls to mind the manipulation of scientific truth by
the Soviet government in the Lysenko controversy. The Court's purposes may be more
laudable and the politics involved less spectacular, but the assumptions about the nature
of reality are the same.
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Ajfiir, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 157.
109 For another highly questionable judicial response to social science data, see U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge William Doyle's attempt to resurrect Blackstonian jurisprudence in
his contention that such information is alien to the federal judiciary's constitutional law deci-
sions in the desegregation field. See Doyle, supra note 30, at 18.
110 See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 20, at 28-31.
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